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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENTS:
THE ROLE OF DECISION THEORY IN
UNSCRAMBLING THE BENZENE DECISION
By
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.*
As any practicing lawyer knows, file cabinets contain two
form briefs for cases involving judicial review of administrative
action affecting technologies. One, for the losers below, bristles
with irate talk about administrative caprice, urges exacting scru-
tiny, and cites Overton Park.1 The other, for the winners below,
speaks dispassionately of administrative expertise, counsels defer-
ence, and cites Vermont Yankee. Often a party is both winner
and loser below, and this calls for deft departmentalization in the
brief, simultaneously urging rigorous oversight on one issue while
discouraging judicial overreaching on another.
Judges, too, accumulate boilerplate responses, one in defense
of a hands-off disposition, another for explaining a decision to lay
the hands on. Any conscientious search for guidance on whether
to intervene or defer is likely to come up short. The Administra-
tive Procedure Act is positively misleading in some particulars,3
and anyone relying on it for an account of the scope of judicial
review of administrative action during the decade of the 1970s
would be sorely embarrassed. For a number of years, the Supreme
Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit pursued mutually oblivious approaches to the scope of ju-
* Professor of Law, University of Washington; A.B. 1961, Harvard College;
LL.B. 1965, Columbia University.
Appreciation is expressed to my colleagues William R. Andersen and James
H. Hardisty, who stimulated my thinking on this subject.
1. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971). See
Wright, Commentary on Rulemaking and Judicial Review, 30 AD. L. REV. 461
(1978).
2. Vermont Yankee Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978).
3. This is true, for example, of the statutory expectation that adjudicatory
proceedings will be reviewed more closely than legislative rulemakings. Compare 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)(1976) with 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E)(1976). See Verkuil, Judicial
Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REV. 185 (1974); Auerbach, Informal
Rulemaking: A Proposed Relationship Between Administrative Procedures and
Judicial Review, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 15 (1977).
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dicial review and the deference due agency procedures and fact
finding." The Supreme Court encouraged intervention in its 1971
Overton Park decision, cited hundreds of times by the lower fed-
eral courts, but called for deference in its unanimous 1978 Ver-
mont Yankee decision, cited on scores of occasions since. All the
while the suspicion has arisen, certainly among practitioners who
can say such things, that the grand synthesizing principle that
tells us whether the court will dig deeply or bow cursorily de-
pends exclusively on whether the judge agrees with the result of
the administrative decision. This harsh descent to legal realism-
and a cynical version at that-does not lack empirical ammuni-
tion. There are enough administrative agencies today making de-
cisions on enough subjects to rile or please just about anybody
with a set of moderately fixed convictions, and most judges qual-
ify on that score. Consistency and neutral principles are not
problems until there are many occasions for decision; the reach
and complexity of contemporary administrative law have made
them problems.
Recently, the issues of regulatory reform, judicial review, and
the allocation of decisionmaking authority on technical matters
have come together in a spirited national debate over the proper
role of cost-benefit analysis in health and environmental decision-
making.5 Last term, in Industrial Union Department, AFL-CIO
v. American Petroleum Institute,6 the benzene health standards
case, the Supreme Court entered the fray, but in five separate
opinions covering 120 pages did little to clarify the issues. This
type of judicial anarchy, so typical of the Burger Court, may re-
flect not so much a lack of leadership or a personal contentious-
ness among the justices as the fact that we live in a time when
values are in disarray. Institutions caught in the flux of techno-
logical and social change are in for a rough ride until and unless
new grounds for consensus emerge. The Court quickly granted
4. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, The D.C. Circuit, and the Su-
preme Court, 1978 S. CT. REV. 345, 360-75.
5. See Baram, Cost Benefit Analysis: An Inadequate Basis for Health,
Safety, and Environmental Regulatory Decisionmaking, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 473
(1980); Rodgers, Benefits, Costs, and Risks: Oversight of Health and Environ-
mental Decisionmaking, 4 HARV. ENVT'1 L. REV. 191 (1980); Williams, Benefit-
Cost Analysis in Natural Resources Decisionmaking: An Economic and Legal
Overview, 11 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 761 (1979).
6. 100 S. Ct. 2844 (1980).
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certiorari in a case involving the Occupational Safety and Health
Administration's coke oven emission standard,' and is obviously
aware that more must be said on the subject of institutional re-
sponsibilities for health regulation of low-level pollutants.
I.
At issue in the benzene case were OSHA regulations whose
chief feature was a reduction in the allowed average airborne ben-
zene exposure level from 10 parts per million (ppm) to 1 ppm.
The 10 ppm standard reflected benzene's long known
nonmalignant toxic effects.' Recent evidence' led OSHA to con-
clude that benzene was a carcinogen,'0 but the leukemogenic risk
was documented only at levels higher than the 10 ppm standard
already in effect. 1 In establishing the new standard, OSHA
sought to rely on a general policy judgment that exposure to
known carcinogens should be reduced to the lowest feasible
level.' 2
The plurality opinion in the benzene case (Mr. Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Mr. Justice Stewart, and,
in important particulars, by Mr. Justice Powell) came down on
the point that the pertinent provisions of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 19701s must be read as requiring the Secretary
of Labor to find, as a precondition to imposing a permanent
health and safety standard, "a significant risk of harm and there-
fore a probability of significant benefits.""' The plurality's conclu-
sion, that the Act "implies" 5 a requirement that workplaces be
7. American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978), cert.
granted, 100 S. Ct. 3054 (1980) (voluntarily dismissed). Recently, the Supreme
Court granted review of two cases involving OSHA standards for cotton dust.
American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3208-09 (1980) (No. 79-
1429); National Cotton Council of America v. Marshall, 49 U.S.L.W. 3209 (1980)
(No. 79-1583).
8. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028 (c)(1)(i) (1979).
9. 43 Fed. Reg. 5918-25 (1978).
10. Id. at 5918, 5931.
11. Id. at 5925-32.
12. Id. at 5918, 5932.
13. §§ 3(8), 6(b)(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 652(8), 655(b)(5) (1976).
14. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2865; see id. at 2862-66.
15. Id. at 2864. Interestingly, the plurality opinion at one point misquotes
§ 3(8) of the statute, 29 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976), reading the "reasonably necessary
19811
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found unsafe-a finding which was not made' -circumvented
one problem but created another. The problem avoided was
whether, in the event appropriate findings were made and sup-
ported, the statute permitted regulations only if their benefits
exceeded their costs,' 7 or if it called for selection of the most pro-
tective standard compatible with the survival of the industries
regulated, as the Secretary and several lower courts had held.18
By focusing on the preliminary finding, the plurality sidestepped
the cost-benefit issue, although hinting at several points that it
preferred the reading more restrictive of OSHA's authority."0 But
the plurality was obliged to take up the sensitive question of
whether a massive record (fifty volumes, ninety-five witnesses)
devoted substantially to the issue of the desirability of reducing
airborne concentrations of benzene from 10 ppm to 1 ppm was
compiled without any administrative perception of whether
health benefits would be realized. Because the Administrator be-
lieved the regulation would yield benefits and said so,20 the plu-
rality was forced to consider who had the burden and how much
proof was enough, which is perhaps the most difficult single issue
or appropriate" language as "reasonably necessary and appropriate." 100 S. Ct. at
2862-63 (emphasis added). The disjunctive language tends to support OSHA's ar-
gument that § 3(8) is not to be understood as a constraint upon the agency action.
See id. at 2883 (Opinion of Rehnquist, J.); Note, American Petroleum Inst. v.
OSHA, 10 ENVT' L. 664, 667 (1980).
16. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2850. The Secretary did find that benefits from the tighter standard were likely
to be "appreciable," see id. at 2870, and it is difficult to resist the conclusion that
the whole regulatory exercise was based upon the understanding that reductions
in benzene exposure justified the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars.
See id. at 2876 (Powell, J., concurring).
17. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit did not expressly require that
benefits exceed costs. American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 483, 502-03
(1978). The opinions of the Supreme Court are qualified on this point. See Indus-
trial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. at 2863
(Stevens, J.) (reserving decision on whether "the benefits of the regulation must
be commensurate with the costs of its implementation"); id. at 2877 (Powell, J.)
(reading the statute as requiring "that the economic effects of its standard bear a
reasonable relationship to the expected benefits").
18. See Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S.
Ct. at 2862; Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 478 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825, 835-37 (3d Cir.
1975).
19. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2866, 2869.
20. See id. at 2869-72, especially 2870.
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presented by the regulation of exposure to low-level pollution.2 1
In what is the most unsatisfactory part of its opinion, and one
bearing the stamp of several rewrites, the plurality ruled that
substantial evidence did not support the conclusion that the 10
ppm standard then in effect presented a significant risk of health
impairment,2 perhaps because of failure of explanation, neglect
in attempting to construct dose-response correlations from epide-
miological data, wooden reliance upon an assumption that the
statute required no proof, or unacceptable attempts at
quantification. 8
Concurring, Chief Justice Burger stressed that the Secretary
failed to make the required findings on significant risk.24 But,
sensitive to the fact that Mr. Justice Stevens' searching criticism
of the record could be understood as judicial overreaching, the
Chief Justice pointed out that requiring the Secretary to "retrace
his steps with greater care and consideration" should not be un-
derstood as interfering with the administrator's discretion to
make "a policy judgment" about a significant risk when exercis-
ing, as here, "the prerogatives of the legislature." '25 Similarly, in a
separate concurrence, Mr. Justice Powell emphasized that an ad-
ministrative inability to quantify the risk would not necessarily
defeat regulation and that properly adopted policy judgments
could serve to support the necessary findings.2 6 But Mr. Justice
Powell, conceding it to be a "close" question,2 7 concluded that
21. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 219-25; Doniger, Federal Regulation of Vinyl
Chloride: A Short Course in the Law and Policy of Toxic Substances Control, 7
ECOLOGY L.Q. 497 (1978); Leape, Quantitative Risk Assessment in Regulation of
Environmental Carcinogens, 4 HARV. ENVT'1 L. REV. 86 (1980).
22. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2870. The key question for the courts, of course, is whether the agency can
support the standard it selects, not refute some other standard. One wonders if
the threshold findings requirement of significant risk would be relaxed if, say, the
standard was being reduced not to 1 ppm but to 8 ppm. For that matter, if the
starting point was one at which admitted damage took place, say at 100 ppm,
could administrative judgment sustain reductions to the level of 1 ppm, past the
point of diminishing provable returns at 10 ppm?
23. Id. at 2871 n.64. The Secretary's factual finding of "risk" must be "quan-
tified sufficiently to enable the Secretary to characterize it as significant in an
understandable way." Id. at 2866.
24. Id. at 2874.
25. Id. at 2875.
26. Id. at 2875-77.
27. Id. at 2877.
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there was not substantial evidence to support any administrative
findings that risks were unsusceptible to quantification and were
significant at current exposure levels. 2 8 Moreover, Mr. Justice
Powell took up the challenge passed over by the plurality and
read the statute as allowing a reduction of exposure levels only so
long as costs bear a reasonable relationship to expected benefits,
rather than a reduction limited solely by industry's ability to bear
the cost.2 9 So read, OSHA's pro forna insistence that the costs
were "justified," influenced in no small part by an interpretation
of the statute under which costs were only marginally pertinent, 0
stood without adequate explanation, a ground thoroughly under-
stood as authorizing a remand under contemporary notions of ju-
dicial review."1
Mr. Justice Powell declined to address the question of
whether another reading of the statute (presumbly OSHA's)
would offend the delegation doctrine.8 2 Mr. Justice Stevens'
plurality opinion plainly viewed the required findings as a way
around what was perceived to be a serious issue of excessive dele-
gation of legislative power.88 Great interest will attend this sud-
den rediscovery of the delegation doctrine, which was but a joke
only a few years ago,84 particularly since, in a separate concur-
28. Id. at 2876-77.
29. Id. at 2877-78. Note that the Clean Water Act similarly anticipates con-
trols bounded only by the notion that benefits be not wholly disproportionate to
the costs of removal. See W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.12 (1977).
30. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst. 100 S. Ct.
at 2877.
31. See id. at 2878 n.8, citing Judge McGowan's well known decision in In-
dustrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 475-76 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
More recent opinions by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit include National Lime Ass'n v. EPA, 14 Envir. Rep. (BNA) (ERC) 1509
(May 19, 1980). On the hard look doctrine generally, see Rodgers, A Hard Look at
Vermont Yankee: Environmental Law Under Close Scrutiny, 67 GEo. L.J. 699
(1979).
32. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2844, 2875 n.1.
33. Id. at 2866.
34. See Mr. Justice Marshall's comments in National Cable Television Ass'n,
Inc. v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 352-54 (1973) (dissenting); see also Federal
Energy Administration v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559 (1976). Cf.
Freedman, Delegation of Power and Institutional Competence, 43 U. CHI. L. REv.
307 (1976); McGowan, Congress, Court and Control of Delegated Power, 77
COLUM. L. REV. 1119 (1977); Schotland, After 25 Years: We Come to Praise the
APA and Not to Bury It, 24 AD. L. REV. 261, 263-64 (1972); Schwartz, Of Admin-
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rence, Mr. Justice Rehnquist became one of the few Supreme
Court Justices since the 1930s explicitly to embrace the view that
an act of Congress may be invalidated on the ground that the
legislature passed on to an administrator too much of its policy-
making authority. Focusing upon the statutory direction to the
Secretary to protect employees from material impairment of
health "to the extent feasible" in standards dealing with toxics,s6
Mr. Justice Rehnquist found the language to be a "legislative
mirage,"'s susceptible to any number of readings, including en-
forcement to the extent of closing many businesses, or the draw-
ing of distinctions on economic, administrative, or even political
grounds. Pointing out that the question of "whether the law of
diminishing returns should have any place in the regulation of
toxic substances is quintessentially one of legislative policy,"
7
Mr. Justice Rehnquist made the case for Congress facing up to
the crucial policy decisions. He invoked familiar separation of
powers delegation arguments such as congressional account-
ability, the need to guide the administrative hand, and the need
to identify standards for the courts to enforce. The Rehnquist es-
say on delegation is certain to spark considerable interest not
only because of its novelty but because it raises nontrivial ques-
tions of institutional responsibility.
The dissent in the benzene case, written by Mr. Justice
Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan, White, and Blackmun, is
strong, confident, and biting. Upon the assumption that the re-
cord supported a predictive, not a quantified, judgment of bene-
fits, the question for the dissenters was whether the law permit-
ted the Secretary to act immediately or whether further study
and documentation were in order.8 The dissenters, of course,
were inclined to cite the complexity of the subject, the need for
discretion in policy decisions, and the desirability of deferring to
the agency judgment on matters not susceptible to factual proof.
istrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic, THE LAWS, and Delegations of
Power, 72 Nw. U.L. REV. 443 (1977); Stewart, The Reformation of American Ad-
ministrative Law, 88 HARM. L. REV. 1667, 1683-84 (1975); Wright, Beyond Discre-
tionary Justice, 81 YALE L.J. 575, 582-86 (1972).
35. Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct.
at 2879.
36. Id. at 2883.
37. Id. at 2886.
38. Id. at 2895.
1981]
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The statute was read, not as requiring that benefits bear a reason-
able relationship to costs, but rather that the exposure standard
be capable of achievement in an economic and technological
sense, 9 thus essentially adopting the Secretary's interpretation.
Nor did the dissent find any serious delegation problems, reading
"feasible" as meaning capable of achievement, and pointing out
that "Congress could rationally decide that it would be better to
require industry to bear 'feasible' costs than to subject American
workers to an indeterminate risk of cancer and other fatal
diseases. 40
II.
The opinions in the benzene case demonstrate the rich med-
ley of issues raised by attempts to regulate low level exposures to
toxic pollutants. Ascertaining the effects tests the limits of scien-
tific capability. Uncertainty abounds. Decisions, if they are to be
made, will be constrained guesses, and the outcome will be influ-
enced significantly by who has the burden of producing evidence,
how much is enough, and the permissible range of predictive
judgment. Who will do the guessing and second-guessing, and
under what constraints, are matters of considerable institutional
tension. It is hardly surprising that the law of health and environ-
mental regulation has come to rest heavily upon such issues as
required administrative findings, the scope of judicial review, and,
now, the delegation doctrine. 1
In attempting to sort out a proper role for the courts in cases
such as the benzene case, it might be helpful to step back for the
moment to review various theories of administrative decisionmak-
ing."' Ideally, acceptance of a descriptive theory of administrative
rulemaking would help the courts greatly in their oversight of
39.. Id. at 2902 n.30.
40. Id.
41. See Rodgers, supra note 31, at 701-08; W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§ 1.5 (1977).
42. By decisionmaking, I mean the rulemaking, usually under a variety of hy-
brid procedures, that represents the prominent form of contemporary administra-
tive action on technological issues. See Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal
Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38 (1975). What we are talking about, then, are theories
of administrative legislation. My aim is to give guidance to the courts in their
normative judgments of judicial review by focusing upon contrasting descriptive
theories of administrative decisionmaking.
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agency actions, and allow them to identify the occasions for sharp
scrutiny or mild deference. A reasonably complete theory would
tell the courts how agencies decide, through whom, and with what
interest representation; how they manage, receive, and assess in-
formation; and how they view and respond to constraints upon
them. Obviously, formal records (often supplemented by extra re-
cord submissions) tell the courts some of these things, but they
are inevitably incomplete, too complete, or positively misleading.
Few practitioners believe that judges read, much less studiously
follow, the monstrous records thrust before them. Nor do these
records deserve reading, contrived and formless as they are. Not a
few appellate judges will admit that a close reading of the record
is one of the poorer investments of available decision time. All
this means is that there is room to guide judicial intuition by ref-
erence to common sense, philosophy, and perhaps a little bit of
administrative theory.
There are three prominent contenders for the most suitable
descriptive theory of contemporary administrative decision-
making, and many lawyers undoubtedly have subscribed to all
three at various times. The first is what may be called the classi-
cal theory, which views the administrator as a surrogate for the
legislative policymaker. Rulemaking, under this view, is a free-
wheeling and many-splendored process in which the administra-
tor reaches out for information from any source-hearings, librar-
ies, whispers in the hall. Decisionmaking is perceived to be
intuitive, involving as it does horsetrading among the interests
and the deft balancing of value choices. Experience, stability, and
expertise are valued decisionmaking traits, as lawmakers are ex-
pected to know the players, know the industry, and know the his-
tory of prior arrangements. Negotiated settlements are the norm,
and the multiple member regulatory agencies are expected to
achieve decision by compromise, adjustment, and even the log-
rolling so familiar to the legislative process. Relationships with
Congress are close, usually congenial and informal. The expected
product of this process is legislation in the classical sense, and it
is thought to embody the characteristics commending that law-
making mode-generality, avoidance of piecemeal adjudication,
prospective guidance, accommodation of a variety of interests,
and definitive resolution. 3 This classical perception of adminis-
43. These characteristics of rulemaking are admirably summarized in Judge
19811
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trative rulemaking is the one most lawyers and judges were ex-
posed to in law school," and it is a theory with a substantial fol-
lowing today.
A second model, in many ways the converse of the first, could
be called the rational or formal model of administrative decision-
making. While we may succumb to classical thought patterns
when we reflect nostalgically back upon our days in law school, we
are apt to accept the formal model during our overdrive moments
when we think idealistically about reform and improvement. Con-
temporary decision theory, embracing such subjects as systems
and cost-benefit analyses, linear programming, and game theory,
has experienced its phenomenal growth largely since enactment of
the Administrative Procedure Act in 1946. These decision meth-
ods to a large degree depend upon the identification of alterna-
tives, the projection of consequences, and the conscious selection
of a "best" decision.' 5 Decisionmaking is perceived to be less po-
litical than under the classical theory and more scientific. Infor-
mation from any old source will not do; scientific reliability is re-
quired and for some reason this often is associated with
quantification. There is a heavy reliance upon outside technical
consultants. Modeling, decision trees, and risk analyses are much
in vogue, and data needs are compelling. Decisionmaking by intu-
ition is scorned; on the contrary, the method must be wholly ra-
tional, and it anticipates that there is indeed some "best" deci-
sion out there if sufficient attention is paid to finding it.
Under this model, formal proceedings are appropriate, but
they are preferably confined to the technically competent. There
is little need to cater to the citizen or to other lesser interests who
can offer little more than statistically irrelevant expressions of
Wright's opinion in National Petroleum Refiners Ass'n v. FTC, 482 F.2d 672
(1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
44. See, e.g., W. GELLHORN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS (1941); J.
LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (1938). For a reaffirmation of the view that
administrative regulations are the equivalent of statutes, see Mr. Justice Brandeis'
opinion in Pacific States Box & Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935), dis-
cussed approvingly by the editors in W. GELLHORN & C. BYSE, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW: CASES AND COMMENTS 275 n.4 (7th ed. 1979). See also White, Allocating
Power Between Agencies and Courts: The Legacy of Justice Brandeis, 1974 DuKE
L. J. 195.
45. See generally E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALY-
s5S (1978).
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pain and pleasure. Administrative expertise, under this theory,
means not so much a sophisticated savvy about the business of
the agency as it does a knowledge of pertinent technologies, re-
quiring a stable of professionals skilled in a variety of disciplines.
A decision is not a negotiated bill of accord, with a little bit here
and there for the prominent interests and bearing the stamp of
consensus; it is perceived as correct and definitive, carefully de-
veloped and imposed. Under this view, relationships with Con-
gress, especially among the technical decisionmakers, are not
close, often uncongenial and formal. What emerges from this ad-
ministrative process is legislative in form, but it rings of snob-
bishness and may lack the legitimacy and the shopworn staying
power often associated with even unpopular congressional enact-
ments. That formal decisionmaking has some role in regulatory
lawmaking today is evident from a reading of most administrative
and judicial opinions on the subject, including the benzene opin-
ions; today, faith in wholly rational decisionmaking is widespread
and is reflected in highly unusual ways.6
A third, and now eminently popular, theory of administrative
decisionmaking is the theory of successive limited comparisons,
known less elegantly as the science of muddling through.4 7 This is
my own nominee, in essential particulars, for the theory best cap-
turing the realities of how agencies decide. This is a hybrid the-
ory, combining the classical and formal approaches. The central
46. One of my favorite illustrations is a network radio report I heard in June,
1980, on the abortive military attempt to rescue the Iranian hostages. The gist of
the report was that if the number of helicopters in the rescue attempt had been
increased from eight to ten, the prospects of success would have been increased by
only 2.7%. Hearing this, one can only wonder what the response of General Pat-
ton or, say, Genghis Khan would have been if presented with comparable insights
by a decision analyst. By way of contrast, Luke Skywalker of Star Wars shut
down the computers and relied upon "The Force" in the final attack against the
Death Star. This is the celebration, I take it, of intuitive judgment over rational
decisionmaking in some areas of human endeavor.
47. Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," 19 PUB. AD. REV. 79
(1959); Lindblom, Still Muddling, Not Yet Through, 39-PUB. AD. REV. 517 (1979);
Wilson, The Dead Hand of Regulation, 25 PUB. INTEREST 39, 51-52 (1971); C.
LINDBLOM, THE INTELLIGENCE OF DEMOCRACY: DECISION MAKING THROUGH MUTUAL
ADJUSTMENT (1965). Cf. R. CYERT & J. MARCH, A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF THE FIRM
(1963); W. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).
See also Shapiro, Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Making: Incre-
mentalism or Stare Decisis?, 2 LAW TRANSITION Q. 134 (1965) (suggesting applica-
tions of theories of incrementalism to the study of the courts and the law).
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tenets reject the idea that decisions represent formally identifi-
able and discrete "correct" results. Rather, decisionmaking is a
process of strategic adaptation over time, incremental advance,
and partial resolution. Like the classicists, the muddlers reach out
to the interest groups and engage them in negotiation and
searches for common criteria, or at least agreed-upon processes.
They are similarly familiar, however, with the techniques and
methods of formal decisionmaking, although the data which is re-
ceived is altered and shaped to take into account financial, infor-
mational, administrative, and political limits. Cost-benefit analy-
ses within the agencies, for example, bear only an approximate
resemblance to the theoretical ideal of welfare economics which
serves as the foundation of the practice. 8 Decisionmaking by the
muddlers is a process that bends with the breeze, rolls with the
punch, runs for daylight. It works by fits and starts, 9 by floating
proposals, by reworking them to blunt anguished objections, by
amendment over time. It requires successive trips to the Federal
Register, referrals to advisory committees, the birth and rebirth
of task forces. Decisionmaking is marked by long delays, repeated
hearings, erratic shifts as one or another faction gains temporary
ascendancy. Decisions reflect combinations of truncated formality
(considering alternatives within perceived limits), and intuitive
policy and political judgments. The agency houses both technical
and political experts, and may call on both during the course of a
decision. The legislative judgments that emerge may combine the
technical ideal, the negotiated compromise, and the temporary
pastiche. That the muddlers are out and about in contemporary
administrative agencies is illustrated by ample ammunition citing
delay, inconsistency, and error exposed during current regulatory
reform debates.50
Whatever the theory best describing the rulemaking work of
the agencies, it is apparent that agency judgments and behavior
are influenced importantly by institutional constraints repre-
sented by the courts and the Congress. Since I am attempting to
derive an appropriate role for the courts by focusing upon agency
48. See Rodgers, supra note 5, at 199-201.
49. See Goldberg, Controlling Basic Science: The Case of Nuclear Fusion, 68
GEo. L. J. 683, 720-25 (1980).
50. See, e.g., SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 95TH CONG., 1977-
1978, PRINCIPAL RECOMMENDATIONS AND FINDINGS OF THE STUDY ON FEDERAL REGU-
LATIONS (Sept. 1979) (prepared pursuant to S. Res. 71).
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decisionmaking, my comments at this point will be limited to the
constraint represented by the Congress. Here too, I believe that
one's theoretical perception of the legislative process offers in-
sight into how the agencies should and do respond, which in turn
gives guidance on how courts should behave.
The predominant view of legislation as a means of social con-
trol, Austinian in origin, is that an Act of Congress is a command.
It retains that quality over time in the face of changing values or
disobedience unless and until the social imperative is relieved by
further action of the lawmaking body."' Under this classical view
statutory law is meant to settle disputes, give answers, guide con-
duct, and reflect some degree of permanence and stability.
Several of the countermajoritarian protections in the Constitution
(bicameralism, regional representation in the Senate, extraordi-
nary majorities for veto overrides) can be viewed as techniques
for contributing to the stability of the legislative product.83 Fixed
rules of action depend upon consensus-building by the legislature,
and the Congress, as the sole institution with majoritarian cre-
dentials, is viewed as the consensus-builder par excellence. How
this social agreement is put together-that is, the process of law-
making-is the legislature's business.58 This view of the process of
legislation, so far as the courts are concerned, is a kind of meta-
physical union of conflicting interests out of which emerges soci-
ety's marching orders.
Whatever the general merits of this classical view of legisla-
tion as a relatively stable set of rules, it does not appear to con-
form to reality in the volatile legislative-administrative world of
51. This view is implicit in J. BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION (1914), and it
acounts no doubt for the general opinion that the courts are not empowered to
disregard obsolescent legislation. See Davies, Response to Statutory Obsolescence:
The Nonprimacy of Statutes Act, 4 VT. L. REv. 203 (1979); Gilmore, Putting Sen-
ator Davies in Context, 4 VT. L. REv. 233 (1979); Calabresi, The Nonprimacy of
Statutes Act: A Comment, 4 VT. L. Rav. 247 (1979).
52. This is evident in a number of the Federalist papers, including No. 58 (J.
Madison), No. 62 (J. Madison or A. Hamilton), and No. 63 (J. Madison or A.
Hamilton). Number 62 in particular contains a strong attack against "mutable"
public policies attributable to temporary shifts in sentiment.
53. This is the view expressed in such cases as Townsend v. Yeomans, 301
U.S. 441 (1937) (hearings not a prerequisite for legislative validity); Field v. Clark,
143 U.S. 649 (1892); United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (compliance with
House quorum rules not judicially reviewable).
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the regulation of technology. 4 Today regulatory legislation, at
best, represents a short-lived consensus on generalities soon bro-
ken down by shifting coalitions that emerge as enforcement takes
hold. Legislation is better viewed not as a firm consensus but as a
series of shifting accommodations of interest. The constituencies
that inspired the basic environmental statutes are quite different
from the constituencies that wrought the major amendments
within a few short years. 65 Legislation tends to be experimental,
tentative, based on incomplete information, and heavily reliant
upon process solutions. Legislative action is a continuous process
of oversight, consideration of legislative veto, and committee in-
tervention. A good deal of the legislation requiring consideration
of interests in the administrative process-the Freedom of Infor-
mation56 and Advisory Committee Acts,5 7 the Sunshine Law," the
National Environmental Policy Act"9-benefits not only private
parties but Congress in its oversight role. While under the stricter
versions of the classical view, legislation settles all, under the
looser versions of muddling through, it settles nothing.
54. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
18-29 (1968); V.0. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 9-10 (4th
ed. 1958); R. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); Davies, supra note
51, at 228-29 (1979). Cf. Jaffe, The Illusion of the Ideal Administration, 86 HARP.
L. REV. 1183 (1973) (emphasizing continuous political oversight which reshapes
administrative mandates). See also T. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND
REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1979) (making a strong normative argu-
ment against what is described as interest-group liberalism); E. PURCELL, JR., THE
CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
VALUE (1973).
55. This is demonstrably evident with respect to successive amendments of
the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. In many respects also, the evolutionary
process has involved a movement away from broad generalities (in the Clean Air
Act of 1970) to specific dispositions of ongoing disputes. Much of the commentary
on the 1977 amendments has taken note of this phenomenon. See, e.g., Ackerman
& Hassler, Beyond the New Deal: Coal and the Clean Air Act, 89 YALE L.J. 1466,
1487-1514 (1980); Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans Under the 1977
Clean Air Act Amendments, 78 MICH. L. REV. 155, 201-03 (1979); Domenici,
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J. 475 (1979); Kramer,
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments: A Tactical Retreat From the Technology-
Forcing Strategy?, 15 URB. L. ANN. 103 (1978).
56. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
57. 5 U.S.C. app. 1 §§ 1-15 (1976).
58. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b) (1976).
59. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1976).
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III.
The choice of administrative decisionmaking models and
their legislative counterparts strongly influences one's normative
perceptions of appropriate judicial review. Acceptance of the
classical free-wheeling agency model begets a mild regime of re-
view. Administrative know-how, and ergo judicial deference, ex-
tends even to the reading of the legislative charter and the inter-
pretation to be accorded legal terms.6 0 The agencies, like the
legislative body for which they speak, are accorded wide freedom
in selecting the procedural techniques used to reach their policy
conclusions." They are not held to a record because they do not
decide on a record. 2 The interests the agencies hear and heed,63
and the extent to which they offer explanation of policy choices,
are matters of discretion, as they are with the legislative body for
which they speak.
By contrast, the assumption that agency decisionmakers are
supposed to be rational in the strictest sense of the term encour-
ages a regime of close judicial scrutiny. If the goal is an ideal
"best" decision, departures from standards of perfection are
viewed with intolerance. Interpretation of the legislative charter
should be closely supervised as this charter sets the ultimate
bounds of the formal inquiry undertaken. 4 Procedures, too, are
in for a close reading, both because Congress has made process an
important ingredient of substantive result and because procedural
exactitude has long been associated with correct outcomes. Courts
will look closely to make sure all interests are heard and their
arguments dealt with because, after all, the "best" decision is one
with no losers or at least one where losers are accommodated to
60. E.g., Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951). This model,
however, anticipating rulemakers to be effective legislators, is compatible with the
placement of delegation limits on the legislature.
61. See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
62. Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Consititutional
Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the
Clean Air Act, 62 IOWA L. REV. 713, 729 (1977). See, e.g., Pacific States Box &
Basket Co. v. White, 296 U.S. 176 (1935).
63. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
64. See Bazelon, Science, Technology, and the Court, 208 Sci. 661 (1980);
Rodgers, supra note 5, at 201-14.
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the extent possible. Explanations, supporting studies, and the like
may be demanded, as ideal decisions leave no loose ends. There is
little judicial tolerance for political balancing or policy guesswork
from the agencies, for the results are supposed to be scientifically
derived, and whatever the meaning of the scientific method, it is
thought to yield results supportable by evidence and to differ
sharply from political tradeoff.
Subscribers to the theory of muddling through borrow many
suppositions from the formal decisionmaking school. If anything,
partial, erratic, and fragmented decisionmaking calls for highly
skeptical oversight as pragmatic and ad hoc action proceeds by no
set patterns. Muddlers are apt to stray from the paths of legisla-
tive guidance as the rational method of the moment collides with
a particular statutory imposition. Procedural oversight and inter-
est representation are also important because of the strong pro-
cess orientation of strategic decisionmaking. Explanations of what
was done and why must be demanded by the courts to protect
against the dangers of subjectivity associated with incremental
decisions under uncertain criteria. The essence of the contempo-
rary hard look doctrine of judicial review is to compel explana-
tions of methodology and identification of the criteria for judg-
ment. 5 An important distinction between review under the
formal model and review under the muddling model is that the
latter must leave room for the resolution of uncertainty, and for
policy and value choice."6 Problems are not mastered under this
view, they are strategically overcome, and strategic thinkers must
be allowed intuitive estimates of future events.
It is also probable that the administrator's perception of the
nature of legislation, apart from the instructions it contains, will
influence implementation behavior. Administrators who perceive
themselves as being responsible for carrying out a nonmutable
consensus will act like surrogate legislators, relying strongly on
their own intuitive sense, not much concerned about repudiation
or second-guessing. Administrators who perceive themselves to be
the temporary holders of a delicate compromise will be more cir-
cumspect procedurally, perhaps less innovative and arbitrary, and
attentive to building conclusions that will withstand subsequent
65. See Rodgers, supra note 31, at 701-08.
66. Rodgers, supra note 5, at 216-18; Gori, The Regulation of Carcinogenic
Hazards, 208 Sci. 257 (1980).
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scrutiny and reconsideration.
It is clear that today's hard look doctrine of judicial review
and yesterday's delegation doctrine are grounded upon similar in-
sights about the deficiencies of broadly written regulatory legisla-
tion-lack of notice to the affected, lack of opportunity to partici-
pate in rule formulation, prospects of administrative caprice and
discrimination, and legislative cowardice in handing over lawmak-
ing power while retreating to the role of the second-guessing op-
portunist. Yet, the prescriptions for these maladies differ sharply.
Hard look holdings attempt to make sense out of vague delega-
tions, enforce policy declarations discernible there, and do their
best to reconcile contradictory and contrived legislative histo-
ries." Lack of notice, exclusion of interests from participation,
and administrative abuses are exposed and rooted out, not railed
against as possibilities to be avoided. By way of contrast, a hold-
ing of excessive delegation is a declaration of failure, and a deci-
sive one at that. It sends the legislature back to go, permits ambi-
guity of means to repeal any purpose demonstrated by adoption
of a law, and, most importantly, rewards legislative cowardice
with a second chance entirely unimpeded by the consequences of
the first choice. One wonders whether treating a vague choice as if
it were no choice will encourage continued vagueness or more pre-
cision. If political decision-avoidance is the compelling legislative
motivation, vagueness and likely judicial invalidation offer an
attractive way out.
Invalidating vague delegations would appear most appealing
to courts subscribing to the classic conception of legislation as a
stable expression of consensus. Vague statutes mask disagree-
ments, and hiding differences allows enactment where there are
no common criteria and where the lawmakers subscribe to differ-
ent aims. A strict regard for the separation of powers suggests a
judicial insistence upon a clear expression of consensus before the
administrators can commence implementation, especially because
there are few oversight constraints once they do. Conversely,
judges viewing the legislative process as a series of snapshots of
shifting interests would be more inclined to find meaning in
vague legislation, upon the assumption that legislative reconsider-
67. It is often overlooked that Hamilton's well-known brief for judicial review
in The Federalist No. 78, invokes the analogy of conflicting legislative enactments
where the courts must do their best to sort out contradictory legislative messages.
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ation is perhaps more likely to follow a hard look affirmance than
it is a delegation reversal. The view that legislation is an ongoing
process of interest accommodation suggests that courts can best
assure political responsibility by taking the legislature at its word
on each occasion, recognizing it may not be the political last word,
but avoiding the conclusion that vague and fragile compromises
are so trivial as to be considered void.
IV.
The several decisions in the benzene case point up the need
to settle upon a theory of administrative decisionmaking, and ap-
ply it consistently. Justice Stevens' plurality opinion comes close
to adopting the rational decisionmaking model, and demonstrates
the vulnerability of that model to judicial nitpicking over eviden-
tiary gaps in the record supporting the supposedly ideal decision.
Mr. Justice Burger's concurring opinion is classicist in tone, pre-
pared to defer broadly to the policy and procedural choices of the
agency. That he nonetheless finds evidentiary and explanatory
shortcomings suggests that the classical model is vulnerable in
that it shuts off judicial inquiry into a wide range of subjects es-
sential to the understanding of contemporary administrative ac-
tion and thus the essentials of a fair review. Mr. Justice Powell
comes down somewhere between the muddling and the rational
decisionmaking model, honoring the agency's ability to make pre-
dictive judgments but finding insubstantial evidence to support
the conclusion that the risk perceived was a significant one. The
dissenters are probably believers in muddling, and the analysis
adopted is consistent with that theory. Mr. Justice Marshall's
opinion, however, together with the Stevens and Powell opinions,
makes clear that the choice of theory does not automatically dic-
tate results. Courts overseeing administrative muddlers must dis-
tinguish between explanations, which are sharply scrutinized, and
predictive judgments to which deference is owed."8 And courts are
obliged also to face up to the questions of who has the burden of
predictive judgment and what investigations are necessary to sup-
port it,69 subjects upon which Congress rarely speaks with clarity
68. Bazelon, The Judiciary: What Role in Health Improvement? (Address to
Annual Meeting of Institute of Health, National Academy of Sciences, Oct. 15-16,
1980). Rodgers, supra note 5, at 216-18.
69. De Long, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy,
65 VA. L. REv. 257, 298-301 (1979); Rodgers, supra note 5, at 219-25. Mr. Justice
[Vol. 11:301
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF RISK ASSESSMENTS
and judges often disagree.
The great debating point of the benzene decisions is the ap-
propriate role of the delegation doctrine, if any, in judicial review
of administrative decisions. Apart from the question of whether
this was the time to apply it,70 the utility of the doctrine, as sug-
gested here, depends significantly on one's theory of the legisla-
tive process. Believers in muddling are unlikely to accept the
assumptions of a sustainable consensus associated with the dele-
gation doctrine. Equally important is the proposition that delega-
tion and close scrutiny are often mutually exclusive means to the
same ends; while Congress occasionally may be able to enshrine a
consensus, often it must be content with fashioning a truce.
Courts insisting before the fact upon what they perceive to be
clear marching orders may read too narrowly the legislative op-
tions. An insistence after the fact that the journey was by an ac-
ceptable route under rules and procedures fairly explained and
applied protects the legislative choice, and does so in a way atten-
tive to the policy concerns attending broad delegations. 71 Rejec-
Marshall protested in his benzene dissent the plurality's undertaking of "nearly de
novo review ... on behalf of institutions that are by no means unable to protect
themselves in the political process." Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Ameri-
can Petroleum Inst., 100 S. Ct. 2844, 2891 n.9 (1980) (citing United States v.
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)). The procedural due process
now widely accorded wealthy and powerful interests under conventional patterns
of hard look review does damage to process theories of the Constitution, which
rely upon representational differences as justifying stricter judicial scrutiny for
underrepresented minorities. See, e.g., J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THE-
ORY OF JuDIciAl REviEw (1980). With procedural differences obliterated between
weak and strong, substantive distinctions are likely to be taken more seriously.
70. The "feasible" language can be read, fairly I believe, as authorizing con-
trols limited only by the financial viability of the regulated industry. Industrial
Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467, 477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1974). So con-
strued, the Secretary has enormous powers and considerable discretion on where
to start. But the criteria for choice are quite restrictive, strongly protective of
health, and hardly open to the administrative meandering associated with broad
delegations.
71. It is recognized that administrative action is necessary to fill in the gaps
of broad delegation, whether by rulemaking, see K. DAvis, DISCRrIONARY JUSTIcs:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 55-57, 59-68 (1969), or adjudication, see Peck, A Critique
of The National Labor Relations Board's Performance in Policy Formulation:
Adjudication and Rule-Making, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 254 (1968); Robinson, The
Making of Administrative Policy: Another Look at Rulemaking and Adjudication
and Administrative Procedure Reform, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 485, 513-28 (1970).
Effective oversight is an important component of a successful administrative im-
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tion of the delegation doctrine need not repudiate the healthy
oversight associated with hard look review.
plementation of the plans of the legislative architect. Bruff & Gellhorn, Congres-
sional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of Legislative Vetoes, 90
HAnv. L. REv. 1369 (1977); McGowan, Congress, Court, and Control of Delegated
Power, 77 COLUM. L. Rav. 1119 (1977); Nathanson, Administrative Discretion in
the Interpretation of Statutes, 3 VAND. L. REv. 470 (1950); Rabin, Job Security
and Due Process: Monitoring Administrative Discretion Through a Reasons Re-
quirement, 44 U. Cm. L. REv. 60 (1976).
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